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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
It is submitted, however, that there is another side to the policy lying
behind this problem that must be considered. If the government seeks to
protect national security, it must procure the finest personnel available,
to further the advancement of atomic research. Such prospective personnel
certainly would not be encouraged to engage in activities which require
loyalty clearances, if those clearances could be revoked on a basis of
faceless-informer evidence. The possible hardship involved may discourage
many who might otherwise be willing to make a career of public employ-
ment.
Opposed to the position of the government is the case of the individual
who stands under suspicion of disloyalty. The harm to him is substantial;
he may lose his employment, his social status may suffer, he may suffer
financially, and his family may be subjected to hatred and ridicule. With
such serious consequences involved, the government should not be per-
mitted to make unfounded charges, shielded by considerations of national
security.2 There is always a danger that a faceless-informer will come
forth, prompted by spite or malice, secure in the knowledge that his real
motives cannot be revealed by confrontation or cross-examination on the
witness stand.
22
There is a conflict of interests, thus presented, which places national
security on one side and the right of the individual on the other. The
benefit to the country as a whole must be balanced against the possible
hardship on the individual under suspicion of disloyalty. A nation can-
not allow full freedom and immunity to those who are reasonably sus-
pected of engaging in subversive activities against it, or its destruction
from within might certainly follow. 23  When and if a real danger to
national security is demonstrated, the rights of the individual must give
way, even to the point of hardship.
24
D. J. NOVOTNY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS-
WHETHER, AFTER ACQUITTAL OR RELEASE WITHOUT CONVICTION, RETENTION
OF IDENTIFICATION DATA IN THE FILES OF A LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT
CONSTITUTES AN INVASION OF AN INDIVrDUAL'S RIGHT OF PRlvACY-Until
the decision in the case of Kolb v. O'Connor,' Illinois Appellate Courts
21 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 71 S. Ct. 624,
95 L. Ed. 817 (1951).
22 See the dissenting opinion of Edgerton, C. J., in Bailey v. Richardson, 86 U. S.
App. D. C. 248, at p. 268, 182 F. (2d) 46, at p. 67 (1949).
23 Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 471 (1919).
24 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).
1 14 I1. App. (2d) g1, 142 N. E. (2d) 818 (1957).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
had not squarely met the problem as to whether an individual has a right
to the return of identification data held by the police after acquittal of a
criminal charge or release without conviction. In that case, six plaintiffs2
joined to bring suit against the chief of police of Chicago for a declara-
tory judgment entitling them to the removal of their photographs and
fingerprints from the files of the Chicago police department or, alternately,
to the return of such records. The trial court denied the defendant's
motion to strike the plaintiff's petition and ordered the defendant to file
his answer. The defendant elected to stand upon his motion and, after
judgment was entered against him, took an appeal to the Appellate Court
for the First District of Illinois. That court reversed the decision in
an opinion which held that the retention of the records in question was
neither contrary to Illinois statutory law3 nor such an invasion of the
plaintiff's right of privacy as to justify granting the relief sought.
4
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis published an article that has since
become the classic exposition of the right of privacy.5 The authors advo-
cated the existence of a "right to be let alone" 6 independent of a proprie-
tary, fiduciary or contractual basis.7 Initial judicial acceptance of the
right of privacy in the United States by an appellate court came in 1905
when the Supreme Court of Georgia handed down its noteworthy opinion
in the case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company.8 In the
half century since the Pavesich case, the vast majority of American juris-
dictions have aligned themselves with the Georgia holding.9 Illinois, a
2 All six plaintiffs had originally been arrested on felony charges. Five had been
tried and acquitted, and the sixth had been released without trial.
SIll. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 708(e), provides for the filing of such
identification data with the Illinois Department of Safety, and for the return of
such records in the event the defendant is found not guilty. The court, however,
held that this statute does not apply to local police departments.
4 The defendant also maintained on appeal that there had been an improper
joinder of parties plaintiff. In view of its decision in respect to the other issues
involved, the court found it unnecessary to rule on this objection.
5 Warren and Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
6 Warren and Brandeis, op. cit. p. 195. The authors acknowledged that Judge
Cooley had coined the phrase in Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (Callaghan
and Co., Chicago, 1888), 2d Ed., p. 29.
7 In the leading English case of Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670
(1818), the court, per Lord Eldon, granted an injunction restraining the publica-
tion of private letters. Unfortunately, Lord Eldon, as a concession to defendant's
counsel In the course of argument, remarked in passing that equity would extend
its protection only to property, as distinguished from personal rights. This dictum
soon became well entrenched as is evidenced by Hoyt v. Mackenzie, 3 Barb. Ch. 320
(N. Y.), 49 Am. Dec. 178 (1848), wherein the court of equity refused to take
jurisdiction to restrain the publication of private letters where there was no value
to the author as literary property. Even at law, in the case of Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 540, 64 N. E. 442 (1902), the court held that
damages were not available for the unauthorized publication of a photograph in the
absence of Injury to the body, reputation, or property.
8 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
9 See cases noted in 31 CHrcAGo-KENT LAW REvTEw 261.
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relative late-comer on the scene, espoused the right of privacy in 1952,
when the question was first presented to an appellate court in the case of
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Company.10 In that case, the plaintiff's picture
was used without her express or implied consent as the subject of an
advertising campaign and such unauthorized publication to the general
public by private individuals was deemed to have been an invasion of
privacy.
Three years prior to the Kolb case, 1 an Illinois Appellate court was
presented with a similar question involving police records. In the case
of Poyer v. Boustead12 the plaintiffs had been arrested for violation of a
city ordinance and, after being placed in jail, were fingerprinted and photo-
graphed. Before their case for violation of the ordinance went to trial,
the plaintiffs instituted suit to enjoin the police from transmitting the
data to other law enforcing agencies. The court held that the plaintiffs,
who based their cause of action upon an Illinois statute, were not entitled
to an injunction prior to the determination of their guilt or innocence.' 3
The Poyer case, however, did establish that the right to take fingerprints
and photographs of arrested persons as a means of detecting and appre-
hending criminals was within the police power of the state and did not
infringe upon the constitutional rights of such persons.
14
In resolving the issue in the case of Kolb v. O'Connor,5 the appellate
court apparently took the position that the retention of photographs and
fingerprints was a privileged invasion of the right of privacy. If the
right of privacy is to mean anything at all, it cannot be denied that any
unauthorized exhibition of a person's photograph and fingerprints is an
invasion of this right. Consequently, one is led to the conclusion that
10 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N. E. (2d) 742 (1952), noted In 31 CHcAGo-KEXT LAW
RFWIEw 261.
11 14 Ill. App. (2d) 81, 142 N. E. (2d) 818 (1957).
123 Ill. App. (2d) 562, 122 N. E. (2d) 838 (1954), noted in 33 Cu:cAoO-KENT
LAw Raviuw 276.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 708(e), which provides for the return of
identification of persons acquitted of felony charges, did not apply to plaintiff's
cause of action wherein there was no allegation nor determination that plaintiffs
were not guilty. In the case of Maxwell v. O'Connor, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 124, 117
N. ID. (2d) 326 (1953), a proceeding was instituted in the criminal court to compel
the return of identification data upon acquittal pursuant to the Ill. Rev. Stat., op.
cit., wherein the court held that the relief sought was more in the nature of a civil
remedy for an invasion of a right of privacy, for which the criminal court lacked
jurisdiction.
14 In the case of State v. Tyndall, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N. E. (2d) 911 (1946), an
injunction was denied in an action brought to compel police officers to surrender or
destroy the record of identification after acquittal of a misdemeanor charge. An
appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question: 333 U. S. 834, 68 S. Ct. 601, 92 L. Ed. 1118 (1948).
15 14 111. App. (2d) 81, 142 N. E. (2d) 818 (1957).
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the action of the defendant was treated as a privileged invasion rather
than that the defendant's acts, in themselves, were insufficient to amount
to an invasion. This hypothesis is strengthened when one considers the
public interest which is involved. That such files as are here involved
are a great aid in the apprehension of criminals and the suppression of
crime is a matter of common knowledge. When one remembers that the
right of the individual must yield to the common good, it is not hard to
conclude that there is ample reason for creating a privilege such as is
herein suggested. It should be emphasized, however, that the question
of an unlimited exhibition by the police to the general public was not
before the court, nor was it given any consideration.
Despite the admitted advantage to the cause of law enforcement, one
cannot help but pause for a moment over the plight of an innocent indi-
vidual caught in the mesh of such a rule. As long as his picture remains
on file, such person is in constant jeopardy of being erroneously selected
as the culprit by some overwrought victim of, or imperspicacious witness
to, a criminal act. Not only is such a person constantly faced with the
latent possibility of being called upon for a precise account of his where-
about at any given time, but he is also subject to the embarrassment and
humiliation of knowing that his photograph, along with those of criminals
and other suspected persons, is being exhibited to persons who might
know him.
The decision in the instant case cannot be described as extraordinary,
or even unexpected. The legal rationale of the court is not open to serious
adverse criticism, especially in view of the uniformity of the decisions in
other jurisdictions and of the summary treatment accorded the question
when first presented to the United States Supreme Court.'" Nevertheless,
because of the disquieting situation in which an innocent person may find
himself, legislation to ameliorate this condition would seem advisable. If
a mandate for the return of such data, as has been imposed elsewhere,
7 is
not thought desirable, then a law requiring that the files of innocent
persons be segregated, with appropriate identification, from those of con-
victed criminals is the least that can be recommended.
MRS. R. CRANDELL
16 State v. Tyndall, 225 Ind. 360, 74 N. E. (2d) 914 (1946), which, upon appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, was dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question: 333 U. S. 834, 68 S. Ct. 601, 92 L. Ed. 1118 (1948).
17 For example, New York requires that all fingerprints and photographic records
of a person be returned to him when a criminal proceeding is determined in his
favor unless there is a previous conviction or another criminal action pending
against him: McKinney's Cons. Laws of New York Ann., Penal Law, § 516.
